Unadequate on-site procedures contributed to the deaths due to the natural event.The procedures required that an inspection must be performed by the unit's responsible after the first earthquake aftershocks. When the tsunami hit the refinery the inspections where still ongoing.

Shut-down occurred at a peak ground acceleration (PGA) of 0.25 g.
The earthquake sensors stopped measuring at 0.45 g; it is believed that the actual shaking forces exceeded this value.

At the industrial site the tsunami reached an height ranging between 2.5-3.5 m.
The fire department had more than 1000 staff and 2400 voluntary fire fighters. These resources were not enough to cope with the consequence of the earthquake and the tsunami. The police and military forces were also disposed. Vulontiers came from all over Japan to help. The national government fire bureau coordinated the activities and dispatched the teams to the various area in need.

Five hours after ignition, fire fighters have no access to the site due to:
- the smoke coming from the facility, and
- the debris created by the tsunami.

Communication was difficult. The debris carried by the tsunami made the road unusable. The company could not be reachable by phone. An helicopter of Japanese army was used to assess the extent of the fire.

On March 15, an access road was made, but the gate of the refinery was blocked by a gasoline pipeline. The on-site fire-fighting equipment could not be used due to tsunami damage. Hence, the fire-fighting equipment had to be brought into the refinery by hand.


The responders had to use heavy breathing apparatus to go into the JX refinery, because a significant amount of asphalt was released, as well as sulphur combustion products.

Some sulphur went underground and continued to burn there. Thus, the fire fighters had to drill holes in the ground to be able to inject water to quench the burning sulphur.

Due to ignition of sulphur and formation of toxic combustion smoke, the mayor issued an evacuation order in a 2 km radius around the refinery, thereby also delaying the intervention of the fire fighting teams.
Before accessing the site, a dosimeter measured a radiations coming from Fukushima. Radiation levels where 0.12 μSv, lower than the fixed limit to stop all activities: 0.3 μSv.

Foam was also used to block the access of oxygen to the spilled flammable materials, but the wind kept blowing the foam away.
Mobile pumps were set up at 4 locations in the western section to pump up river water.

4

200

Shortly before the arrival of the tsunami, most of the 200 employees succeed in finding a shelter and evacuate the site in the following night, but 4 of them and lost their life. They were caught in the tsunami wave during the inspection of the site units.

Oil spots at the surface of the water reveal a massive pollution in the harbour.
At a nearby park, trees and grass were covered with thick crude oil from the accident.

920 M USD

500 M USD

Crude loading and storage facilities restart two months after the event, but the refining units are severely damaged and production is resumed in 2012 (trial operation was started on Jan. 14, 2012).

The exploitation losses are evaluated at 920 millions Euro, of which more than 500 millions remediation costs.

The impact of tsunami dealt minor damages widespread on the whole refinery site:
-pipes and supports were bended or displaced
-storage tanks' basements were eroded by the water flow
-the tsunami damaged the catalytic cracking reactor's supports, which eventually collapsed due to another quake a few days later
-the quake damaged to heat exchangers' supports and foundations
-the shocks wrecked the chimneys
-the truck loading facility was destroyed by the tsunami and subsequent fire
-control room was completely submerged
-pipe racks were damaged due to debris
-the electric components were extensively damaged or destroyed: engines, pumps, control instrumentations, etc...

Damages and loss of production are significant, in the order of several hundred million of Euro. It took about one year to restore refinery's full production capacity.

In restoring the Sendai refinery, JX transferred its land shipment facilities to a place unsusceptible to the impact of tsunami and took measures to shield electrical systems from tsunami.
Moving forward, the company will push forward with work to fully restore shipment facilities and introduce new energy sources in the refinery.
The procedures to follow in case of earthquake have been changed after the tsunami.

LPG tank braces were reinforced to enhance tank resistance to possible future earthquakes.
The doors and windows of the electrical system were elevated and all the instrumentation, equipments and control system were elevated to more than 4 m. All the sensitive documents, safety equipments and IT servers were elevated to more than 8 m.

The shipment facilities were reinforced to 36 lanes to secure stable supply in the winter demand season and boosted its product stockpiles, and JX is set to further strengthen the refinery's to 52 lanes.

The tsunami emergency response procedure is rewritten, removing the control round of the installations safety.
Responders need to be prepared for the consequence of a tsunami impact during response operation:
-responders should all be equipped with life jackets
-the use of rubber boats should be avoided due to the presence of sharp-edged debris
Responders were subjected to high stress:
-response activities could last for an undetermined lapse of time
-responders could worry for the safety of their own family members
-there was high concern for the radiation hazard coming from Fukushima

It is highly recommended a proper psychological training for emergency responders