Natech Accident
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Type
Natech Accident
Date
2022/08/05
Status
Published

Units Involved

  1. Name
    Fuel Tank 1
    Type
    Storage: Atmospheric storage tank
    Description
    The tank was located near the center of the facility and its filling level was at 50% (half of its capacity), containing 26,000 cubic meters (883,000 cubic feet) of fuel. The tank had a diameter of 74 m and can store 300,000 barrels of fuel.
  2. Name
    Fuel Tank 2
    Type
    Storage: Atmospheric storage tank
    Description
    Hours after the explosion of Tank 1, the fire spread to a neighbouring tank which was filled with 52,000 cubic meters of fuel (at full capacity). This tank exploded in the late evening hours of August 7, 2022.
  3. Name
    Fuel Tank 3
    Type
    Storage: Atmospheric storage tank
  4. Name
    Fuel Tank 4
    Type
    Storage: Atmospheric storage tank
    Description
    The fourth tank was empty.

Event Sequences

  1. Name
    Initial event: Explosion and fire at Tank 1
    Unit
    1. Fuel Tank 1
    Description
    The explosion took place on the night of 5 August during a thunderstorm. Lightning struck a crude oil storage tank (at 50% filling level) at the tanker base in the Bay of Matanzas, which caught fire and exploded. The tank was located near the center of the facility and its filling level was at 50%, containing 25,000 cubic meters (883,000 cubic feet) of fuel. Due to the explosion, the cover of the storage tank was ripped off.
    Initiating EventCritical EventMajor Event
    Natural Hazard: Other
    Lightning struck a crude oil storage tank (at 50% filling level) at the tanker base in the Bay of Matanzas.
    -
    Explosion: Other
    The storage tank caught fire and exploded (possibly boilover).
  2. Name
    Domino effect: Explosion and fire at Tank 2
    Unit
    2. Fuel Tank 2
    Description
    Hours after the explosion of Tank 1, the fire spread to a neighbouring tank (at full level), which exploded in the late evening hours of August 7, 2022.
    Initiating EventCritical EventMajor Event
    Natural Hazard: Fire impingement
    Hours after the explosion of Tank 1, the fire spread to a neighbouring tank (at full level).
    -
    Explosion: Other
    Due to the fire, Tank 2 exploded (possibly boilover) in the late evening hours of August 7, 2022.
  3. Name
    Domino effect: Explosion and fire at Tank 3
    Unit
    3. Fuel Tank 3
    Description
    Due to the explosion of Tank 2, the dome of the third tank collapsed and it was put on fire on August 8, 2022 (as stated by state oil firm Cupet).
    Initiating EventCritical EventMajor Event
    Component (Non-structural): Roof damage
    Due to the explosion of Tank 2, the cover of the third tank was blown off.
    -
    Fire: Other
    The tank was put on fire on August 8, 2022.
  4. Name
    Domino effect: Explosion and fire at Tank 4
    Unit
    4. Fuel Tank 4
    Description
    A fourth tank (empty) was also damaged, according to official reports, but it was not destroyed by the flames (as authorities stated on August 9, 2022).
    Initiating EventCritical EventMajor Event
    ---

Emergency Response

Difficulties in Response to the Natural Hazard
Insufficient personnel and equipment to respond to both emergencies: Yes
Natech event prevents access of personnel to natural hazard affected area: Yes
Response to the Natural Hazard
Fire fighters could not get close to the fire due to the high temperatures and the thick smoke.
Difficulties in Response to the Natech Event
Insufficient personnel and equipment to respond to both emergencies: Yes
Response Teams and Equipment Involved
  • International fire fighting teams
  • International hazmat teams
Response to the Natech Event
The countries of Mexico and Venezuela aided Cuba during the event by sending 100 firefighters, firefighting equipment, and two fireboats from both countries. Venezuela sent 85 volunteers and 20 tons of foam and chemicals. China sent aid with rescue and recovery operations.

During the weekend, firefighters sprayed water on the remaining 10 fuel tanks to keep them cool and prevent the spread of the fire. Local officials warned residents to wear facemasks and stay indoors to avoid the sulfur dioxide smoke. The smoke also contained nitrogen oxide, carbon monoxide and other poisonous substances with the risk of acid rain. Five days after the fire started, the fires had been mostly brought under control with grey smoke mostly replacing the original black plumes.

A dark smoke plume, visible on satellite shots, reached Havana and further west, prompting health authorities to urge people to stay indoors.

Consequences

On-site Fatalities
17
On-site Injured
80
Off-site People At Risk
4900
Human Health Impacts
It resulted in the death of 17 firefighters, including young people who were undergoing compulsory military service, and injured from 80 to 125 other people. Most injuries happened during the second explosion on Saturday, 6 August, and concern burn wounds and smoke inhalation.

Local officials warned residents to wear facemasks and stay indoors to avoid the sulfur dioxide smoke. The smoke also contained nitrogen oxide, carbon monoxide and other poisonous substances with the risk of acid rain.
Environmental Impacts
- Black smoke from the fire spread up to 100 kilometers (62 miles) towards Cuba's capital city of Havana.
- Meteorologists predicted toxic rain.
- Officials reported that no oil was spilled into Matanzas Bay.
- A small fire in a wooded area feeding off oil leaking from the terminal was reported to have been extinguished.
Economic Impacts
- The blaze lasted almost a week, destroyed 40% of Cuba’s main fuel depot and shuttered its only supertanker port, which aggravated the energy crisis in the island.
- Fuel and oil shipping operations at the Port of Matanzas weresuspended; tankers and domestic fuel barges were being re-routed to Havana Bay and Cienfuegos.
- Of the eight storage tanks, four were destroyed or unusable. The remaining four storage tanks, while intact, may have been compromised by the heat, according to experts.
Built-up Areas Impacted
  • Industrial areas (e.g. factories)
  • Utilities (e.g. gas, water, electricity, telecommunication)
Community Disruption
- The explosion forced the evacuation of 4,900 people from the city, shut the local thermal power station, and sparked fears of an energy crisis in the country.

- The nearby Antonio Guiteras thermoelectric power plant — Cuba’s largest located about 3 km from the fire— was turned off mid-day Aug. 8; the Energy Ministry said it was due to lack of cooling water. It restarted on the morning of Aug. 9, but was taken offline again Aug. 10.

- State electric utility UNE has since announced daily power generation gaps between 800 and 1,200 megawatts, with extended blackouts.

Remedial Activities

Remediation Activities
- Armed forces helicopters were cooling the facility by dousing it with water from Matanzas Bay.
- On Sunday, 7 August, 82 Mexican and 35 Venezuelan personnel experienced in fighting fuel fires joined the effort, bringing four planeloads of fire-fighting chemicals.
-Military construction specialists have been erecting barriers to contain oil spills.
Restoration Activities
The reconstruction works to the industrial facility, which had already started on April 2023 and expected to last for 16 months, include:

1. New deposits with more security measures:
- the diameter of the tanks will be less than that destroyed;
-tanks equipped with an underground electrical system.

2. The distance between the new deposits will be 110 meters, almost four times more than before.

3. The size of the containment dike would be greater than the capacity of the tank (i.e., in the event of a spill, all the crude remains concentrated in the containment dike).

4. The containment dike is assembled with earth covered with concrete - quality that prevents the collapse of that structure in the event of fire.

5. The base will have more powerful foam cannons and a new position for firefighters in case of emergency, established at a greater distance from the container.

Lessons Learned

Lessons Learned on Equipment
- The short (low safety) distance between the tanks could have been one of the factors in the seriousness of the incident.
- Foam can only be applied to extinguish the fire once the temperatures have been cooled down.
Lessons Learned on Organisational Aspects
- Cuba did not have the means to control a fire of such magnitude, neither in terms of manpower nor in the availability of technical means.
- Cuba’s fire fighters were not trained for situations of this type. Among the 17 fire fighters that lost their lives were young men who were completing their compulsory military service.
Lessons Learned on Emergency Response Aspects
- The cooling capacity seemed insufficient to avoid a domino effect considering the heat created by the fire, the strong wind and height of the flames, the relatively low safety distances between the tanks, and the fact that fire fighters could not get close to the fire due to the high temperatures and the thick smoke.
- It seemed likely that the blaze could not be extinguished and the fire was left to burn itself out until all the fuel was consumed while trying to prevent any further exacerbation of the accident.
ID: 99, Created: Kyriaki GKOKTSI, 2023-04-24 17:18:57 – Last Updated: Kyriaki GKOKTSI, 2023-11-17 14:21:03

Attachments

NoDescriptionFile Size
1.Cuban business news3.07MB
2.Reconstruction works - article in www.cubadebate.cu2.50MB
3.Reconstruction works of the industrial facility - article in www.14ymedio.com486.66KB
4.Wikipedia - Matanzas oil storage facility explosion276.67KB