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Fire on Oil Tank 1901
The fixed fire-extinguishing installation did not work because the water pressure ruptured the foam pipe. Staff had to manually start fire extinguishing pumps; two out of four were out of order. Five employees climbed on the tank and attempted to extinguish the fire manually. Two local fire engines and a the military ship HMS Zuiderkruis also intervened and eventually the fire was extinguished at the end of the afternoon.

Fire on Naphta tank 1931
The deputy chief of the island fire service arrived at around 1 p.m. and went to the naphta tank.
A BOPEC water cannon was also used to cool the outside of the tank, preventing its collapse. An extra "booster-pump" was conncted to the fire-extingushing system, but it broke down. A replacement was brought on site but mulfincitoned. All other mobile fire-extingushing systems were already being used on tank (1901). The island fire service also run out of foaming agent.
Some of the foaming agent supplied by BOPEC was lost because of the numerous malfunctions that required connecting and disconnecting the network several times.
A crash tender was called b the island fire service chief, but it was deployed to fight the fire in the crude oil tank (1901) before being moved to naphta tank (1931) later.
At around 5 p.m. the fire in the oil tank (1901) was extinguished and the equipment was mooved to tank (1931).
The improvised meausre adopted on tank 1931 up to that point were only partially effective. The fire still burned on an entire section of the tank that was next to the staircase, neglecting a safe access to the rim of the tank wall.
Fire officers unsuccessfully attempted to fight the fire from BOPEC's hoisting crane. At 9.35 new drums of foaming agents and water cannons arrived via boat. A new attempt was scheduled for 11 p.m. but preparations were not completed and the 11 p.m. deadline was missed. At 11.15 an explosion was heard and 15 minutes later the fire escalated. Burning fuel splashed over the tank wall and several small explosions were heard. HMS Zuiderkruis ship decided to leave immediately to protect the safety of the ship, leaving Navy personnel on site to help with the relief effort. During the night, the extinguishing effort were halted and a commettee was formed to plan the respose to the escalated accidents while water cannons kept the naphta tank and nearby tanks refrigerated.
The following day a new load of foaming agent arrived from Venezuela. There was no turnover for the fire service team (that was combattign the fire for 24 hours at that point) because the island fire servece did not have any available personnel .
The following day, Friday 10 September, the fire started to recede. At this point the option of letting the fire burn itself was proposed, but the Liutenant Governor decided to continue the effort because wind was blowing the smoke in the direction of the local settlements. At 12 p.m. the fire appeared as extinguished, but it flared up again in the afternoon. At 7 p.m. the fire was again under control.
On Saturday 11 September, the fire broke out again at several point in the tank, only to be definitively extinguished during the afternoon.

One of the facility's biggest tanks was permanently lost. It was never rebuilt.

BOPEC tank design was compliant with API standards dating back to 1974. According to new API 545 recommended practice, adopted since 2009, the tanks should have cables that conduct electricity between the tank wall and tank roof. Additionally, the new recommdations requre metal shunts that connect the roof and the wall to be under the seal, not above and the number of cables and earthing pins was insufficient. The tanks shoud be retrofitted to comlpy with APID 545 recommended practice.

Inspections of such safety equipment were not properly documented. Poor maintenance was probably the root cause of the many failures of safety equipment occurred the day of the accident. A proper maintenance program with extensive documentation is required at BOPEC.

The local authorities did not have a proprer overview of the risks in their island coming from high risk activities. Likewise, they did not take any actions to tackle or control such risks.
As a result, their emergency plans were inadequate. The fire department did not have enough personnel to endure long shifts lasting for severl days and their foaming agent reserves lasted only a few hours. The Leiutenant Governor lamented lack of capacity and knowledge in the island to supervise and enforce safety at high risk activities, and to prepare efficient emergency plans.