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eNatech- Natural-Hazard Triggered Technological Accidents Database
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Natech Accident
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The Joint Research Centre does not guarantee the accuracy and completeness of the data in eNatech. It also reserves the right to cancel or change records without prior notification.
Type
Natech Accident
Date
2013/04/02
Time
19:45
Duration
10 hour(s)
Natural Hazard
Rain and Flood in La Plata Argentina, Argentina, 2013
Site
Argentine state-controlled oil company YPF SA, Argentina
Status
Published
Units Involved
Name
Coking oven
Type
Process: Reactor
Description
tar distillate is converted to coal
Name
Storm water collector tank
Type
Other: Waste disposal
Description
Rainwater is collected and decontaminated and treated before being emitted to the nearby watercourse
Name
Topping unit
Type
Process: Column
Event Sequences
Name
Water polluted by hydrocarbons ignites
Unit
2. Storm water collector tank
Description
A fire started after flooding caused by a major rain storm cut electricity to the entire refinery.
Substances Involved
Name
Waste hydrocarbons
Initiating Event
Critical Event
Major Event
Natural Hazard: Floating oil in drainage systems due to inundation
Water polluted by hydrocarbons overflowed from stormwater catchment network.
Release: Gas, vapour, mist, or smoke release to air
Hydrocarbons floating on flood water reached the coke furnace and produced vapours, due to heat.
Contributing Factors
Organisational: Design of plant / equipment / system:
Inappropriate
To contain possible spills of hydrocarbons, the ground below the oven was at a lower level than the street. This allowed rainwater and hydrocarbon accumulation below the coke oven.
Fire: Conflagration
Even though the unit was shut, the temperature of the unit walls was still high enough to ignite vapors. A fire started in the furnace unit.
Contributing Factors
Organisational: Management organization:
Inadequate
The decision to stop the facility was taken at the very last minute when the site was already flooded. Had the plant been shut for a long time, the coke oven temperature would have been lower.
Name
Explosion and fire at the coking furnace
Unit
1. Coking oven
Substances Involved
Name
Mix of flammable gases
Initiating Event
Critical Event
Major Event
Event Sequence: Water polluted by hydrocarbons ignites
Contributing Factors
Organisational: Design of plant / equipment / system:
Non-existent
The device "did not have the proper safety technology" to prevent fires. Two fires had already occurred earlier the same year.
-
Fire: Conflagration
Gas accumulated inside the oven ignited and exploded. A big conflagration started.
Contributing Factors
Measure: Emergency shut off / safety valves:
Unavailable
The employees found it impossible to access the gas stopcock, which was under water at about 200 meters
Explosion: Pressure burst
The oven at the Topping plant exploded "opening like a flower"
Name
Fire spread to the topping unit
Unit
3. Topping unit
Substances Involved
Name
Crude Oil and other hydrocarbons
Initiating Event
Critical Event
Major Event
Event Sequence: Explosion and fire at the coking furnace
-
Fire: Conflagration
Two fires started at the crude distillation unit
Weather Conditions
Precipitation
Rain
Description
Heavy rainfall and flooding
Emergency Response
Response Planning
Emergency response plan takes Natech events into consideration:
No
Emergency response plan is sufficient in taking Natech events into consideration:
No
Difficulties in Response to the Natural Hazard
Insufficient personnel and equipment to respond to both emergencies:
No
Natech event prevents access of personnel to natural hazard affected area:
No
Natech event prevents efficient operation of personnel in the natural hazard affected area:
No
Difficulties in Response to the Natech Event
Insufficient personnel and equipment to respond to both emergencies:
Yes
Damage to lifelines (e.g. water, power, communication, transportation):
Yes
Response Teams and Equipment Involved
On-site systems (e.g. sprinkler, water cannon)
On-site fire fighting team
On-site hazmat team
Local fire fighting team
Fire fighting teams of nearby plants
Regional / national fire fighting teams
Response to the Natech Event
During the night, the fire departments of different localities of the Region (La Plata, Berisso, Ensenada, Quilmes) had intervened on the site.
When the fire started, the plant was guarded by three operators, a supervisor, and a console operator.
Employees were unable to access the locker room to wear the proper security uniform.
The man of the on-site team that first tried to put out the fire had their clothes soaked with hydrocarbons floating on the water.
Consequences
On-site Material Losses
500
M USD
Economic Impacts
The production was shut for about one week.
The refinery production suffered a significant reduction for months.
The coking plant was replaced two years later.
Over $500 million equipment damage.
Remedial Activities
Restoration Activities
The coking oven was replaced with a new one and the topping unit repaired for a total cost of $500 million
Lessons Learned
Lessons Learned on Equipment
The foam reserves were insufficient for the task and finished quickly. The fire fighting operations were halted for two hours, waiting for new foam supplies.
Lessons Learned on Human Health Aspects
A better training of the personnel and of local firefighter was needed.
"Many of the firefighters were not trained for this type of fire."
Incorrectly, they "began to attack gases that burned." Since the passage of the gas was not shut, when the flames were put off, the gases could spread into large flammable clouds, which ignited again.
Lessons Learned on Organisational Aspects
The on-site fire fighting teams should be bigger.
In a refinery of that size, only 2 employees were trained fire fighters.
Lessons Learned on Mitigation Measures
The units should have all the safety equipment needed to prevent such fires.
Automatic water systems should be installed to prevent fire propagation from one unit to another.
Lessons Learned on Emergency Response Aspects
Adequate protection should be provided to all the personnel and in particular to the fire brigade.
During the accident, the personnel could wear neither breathing apparatus or proper uniforms to protect themselves.
ID: 62, Created: Amos NECCI, 2016-09-16 14:41:07 – Last Updated: Amos NECCI, 2021-11-09 13:32:07
Created: Amos NECCI, 2016-09-16 14:41:07
Updated: Amos NECCI, 2016-09-16 14:48:15
Updated: Amos NECCI, 2019-01-08 17:28:23
Updated: Amos NECCI, 2019-01-08 17:34:35
Updated: Amos NECCI, 2019-01-08 17:48:09
Updated: Amos NECCI, 2019-01-08 17:58:13
Updated: Amos NECCI, 2019-01-08 18:22:30
Updated: Amos NECCI, 2019-01-08 18:23:06
Updated: Amos NECCI, 2019-01-08 18:24:17
Updated: Amos NECCI, 2019-01-08 18:46:44
Updated: Amos NECCI, 2019-01-09 10:05:07
Updated: Amos NECCI, 2019-01-09 11:17:52
Updated: Amos NECCI, 2021-11-09 13:32:07
Attachments
No
Description
File Size
1.
100 Largest losses 23rd edition
7.89MB
2.
La Plata Flooding WSJ
472.12KB
3.
Moreno, 2015
999.91KB
4.
YPF Indipendent
644.48KB
5.
YPF OSDir
122.59KB
6.
YPF reuters
345.25KB