eNatech - Natech Accident

Natech Accident

DISCLAIMER: The Joint Research Centre does not guarantee the accuracy and completeness of the data in eNatech. It also reserves the right to cancel or change records without prior notification.

Type

Natech Accident

Date

2011/07/11

Time

04:30

Natural Hazard

Heat Wave, Cyprus, 2011

Site

Site 24, Cyprus

Status

Published

Units Involved

Name
Open containers
Type
Storage: Other
Description
98 containers containing confiscated explosives and gunpowder were stored in the open. The boxes had been seized two and a half years earlier from a ferry sailing from Iran to Syria and contained shell casings, explosives, gunpowder and other explosive military materials.

Event Sequences

Name

First explosion

Unit

1. Open containers

Description

On 4 July, 7 days before the main Natech event, the contents of one container were believed to have self ignited due to the high external temperature and the container then exploded.

Initiating Event	Critical Event	Major Event
Natural Hazard: Heat radiation damage The storage of the explosive military materials in full sun caused self-ignition and explosion of a container. Contributing Factors Organisational: Management attitude: Inappropriate The containers were left in the open for more than two years. 7 days prior to the accident an officer had already spotted deformation of a container. A team of experts found traces of self ignition and explosion in the container and highlighted that the temperature in the other containers, which were stored in full sunshine, were too high. Thus, the experts warned the base authorities that the deformed container should be removed for a detailed study, and that the remainder of the containers should be cooled. They also recommended that the stored explosives should be destroyed as soon as possible. The concerns of officers at the base related to storing the explosives in the open had been ignored.	-	Explosion: Unknown Contributing Factors Organisational: Isolation of equipment / system: Inappropriate The containers were under inappropriate conditions as they were not isolated and the stabilisation rate of the stored material was not monitored.

Name

Container fire

Unit

1. Open containers

Description

On 11 July, at 4:30, it is believed that the explosion of several containers caused a fire.

Initiating Event	Critical Event	Major Event
Natural Hazard: Heat radiation damage Storage in the open sun at high temperatures caused the explosion of the containers. Contributing Factors Organisational: Management attitude: Inappropriate Experts' warnings that the containers should be cooled and the explosives in the containers destroyed were not followed up on.	-	Fire: Unknown The explosion of several containers caused a fire around 4:30.

Name

Container mass explosion

Unit

1. Open containers

Description

At 5:50, 1h 20min after the fire ignited, the fire triggered a mass explosion of the remaining containers.

Substances Involved

Name
Exposives

Initiating Event	Critical Event	Major Event
Event Sequence: Container fire 80 min after its start, the fire led to the explosion of all remaining containers. Fire fighters and military from the base were handling the fire when the second blast happened.	-	Explosion: Detonation The whole inventory of explosives contained in the containers exploded. The effect was similar to a sonic boom, creating a crater more than 10 m in diameter. Damage due to the blast wave was found up to 5 km away from the source. In addition to causing fatalities, injuries and much destruction onsite, the blast also severely damaged the neigbouring power plant via a domino effect.

Weather Conditions

Precipitation

None

Temperature

40 °C

Emergency Response

Response Planning

Emergency response plan takes Natech events into consideration: No

Emergency response plan is sufficient in taking Natech events into consideration: No

Response Planning Activities

Being aware of the extreme risk, experts had recommended the immediate removal of the deformed container, the cooling of other containers, and destruction of products stored at the earliest. These measures were, however, not implemented before the explosion happened.

Difficulties in Response to the Natech Event

Damage to lifelines (e.g. water, power, communication, transportation): Yes

Response to the Natech Event

Firefighters and soldiers were combatting the fire that had started at 4:30 when at 5:50 the violent explosion occurred.

After the explosion, a team of security experts checked unexploded ordnance and classified it as low risk.

Consequences

On-site Fatalities

Human Health Impacts

The violent explosion killed 6 fire fighters and 7 soldiers. 65 people where injured.

Many fatalities were deplored because the explosion occurred when fire fighters were in the process of combatting the fire that then triggered the explosion.

Environmental Impacts

Monitoring of the air quality showed that pollutants were below the threshold concentrations.

Economic Impacts

There are different estimates for the incurred costs. There are estimates of about 700 million Euro costs due to structural damage, saying it is a worst case estimate.

Another source states that the EU puts the overall cost at 2.83 billion USD. Fixing the power plant alone is estimated to cost 992 million USD.

Built-up Areas Impacted

Industrial areas (e.g. factories)
Residential areas (e.g. housings, hotels)
Commercial areas (e.g. offices, shops)
Public areas (e.g. schools, hospitals)
Utilities (e.g. gas, water, electricity, telecommunication)

Community Disruption

The shock wave from the explosion destroyed two multi-storey buildings, two homes and a church.

Moreover, it damaged within a 5 km radius 240 homes, as well as the generator building and fuel storage tanks at the Vasilikos Power Plant.

As a result of the damage to the power station, it had to be shut down, thereby interrupting the power supply to approximately half of Cyprus. As a consequence, rolling blackouts were initiated.
Drinking water supply was adversely affected due to the power station shut down and the interruption of the energy supply to seawater desalination plants.

Remedial Activities

Remediation Activities

In the immediate aftermath of the event, Greece and Israel provided 12 emergency power generators.

Restoration Activities

It was estimated that the Vasilikos Power Plant could supply 38 MW within 2 to 3 months after the accident, and a further 150 MW after about 6 months (minimum).

A Greek offer of providing 70 MW generating capacity was accepted.

Lessons Learned

Lessons Learned on Organisational Aspects

The operator failed to recognise the potential hazards associated with storing explosives in the open. Also, the containers were left unattended for over two years without any regular control imposed.

Awareness of the hazards and the appropriate storage conditions needs to be raised. Also, management attitude towards safety needs to be improved to guarantee the implementation of appropriate storage and of inspection schemes.

Lessons Learned on Emergency Response Aspects

The fire fighters seem to have been unaware of the dangers associated with the materials stored in the containers when they started intervening to extinguish the fire. Information about the hazard has to be provided before starting the intervention.

ID: 30, Created: Bogdan DORNEANU, 2013-11-05 14:12:31 – Last Updated: Kyriaki GKOKTSI, 2024-02-07 13:30:04

Attachments

No	Description	File Size
1.	Al Jazeera	1.15MB
2.	ARIA 40877	551.64KB
3.	EUCP Report 2011	754.58KB