None

30 °C

90 %

During the period 08 - 11/07/2011, the average air temperature was approximately 30 degrees Celcius and the air humidity was around 90%. On the date and time of the Natech accident, the ambient temperature was between 21.5 - 23.2 degrees Celcius, and the air humidity was ranging from 91% to 97%. The maximum air humidity at 97% was recorded at 05:00 (close to the time of the fire and massive explosion).

Being aware of the extreme risk, experts had recommended the immediate removal of the deformed container, the cooling of other containers, and destruction of products stored at the earliest. These measures were, however, not implemented before the explosion happened.

Firefighters and soldiers were combatting the fire that had started at 4:30 when at 5:50 the violent explosion occurred.

After the explosion, a team of security experts checked unexploded ordnance and classified it as low risk.

13

The violent explosion killed 13 people (6 fire fighters and 7 naval officers). 62 people where injured.

Many fatalities were deplored because the explosion occurred when fire fighters were in the process of combatting the fire that then triggered the explosion.

Monitoring of the air quality showed that pollutants were below the threshold concentrations.

There are different estimates for the incurred costs. There are costs estimates of about 700 million EUR due to structural damage (reported as a worst case estimate).

Another source states that the EU puts the overall cost at 2.83 billion USD. Fixing the power plant alone is estimated to cost 992 million USD.

The shock wave from the explosion caused severe damage or complete destruction of several buildings of the power station. As a result of the damage to the power station, it had to be shut down, thereby interrupting the power supply to approximately half of Cyprus. As a consequence, rolling blackouts were initiated.
Drinking water supply was adversely affected due to the power station shut down and the interruption of the energy supply to seawater desalination plants.

Extensive damage was also caused in the surrounding area as:
- five vehicles were destroyed (i.e., two fire trucks, two National Guard vehicles, one vehicle of the electricity authority in Cyprus) and several others found in the Naval Base;
- the A1 highway were severely damaged;
- several buildings in the Naval Base suffered extensive damage, including the generator building and fuel storage tanks at the Vasilikos Power Plant, and temporary structures were completely destroyed.

The shock wave from the explosion destroyed two multi-storey buildings, two homes and a church.
In the wider area and within a radial distance of two kilometres from the location of the explosion, residential and other buildings suffered light damage. 240 homes were damaged within a 5 km radius.

In the immediate aftermath of the event, Greece and Israel provided 12 emergency power generators.

It was estimated that the Vasilikos Power Plant could supply 38 MW within 2 to 3 months after the accident, and a further 150 MW after about 6 months (minimum).

A Greek offer of providing 70 MW generating capacity was accepted.

The Safety Considerations rules had not been followed for the safe evacuation of personnel in the event of fire in ammunition and explosives sites. Non-essential personnel at both the naval base and the power station should have been evacuated and operations should have been halted since the incident on 04/07/2011, when the deformed container was noticed.

According to the official investigation, the main drivers of this Natech accident were organisational malpractices as well as omissions and negligence from competent authorities, i.e.:
- The explosives storage area did not conform to Ammunition Storage Regulations, as the 98 containers were stacked all together, which violated the requirement for safe separation distance of explosives and their storage in smaller quantities.
- The inappropriate stacking method (i.e., the stack height and the close proximity of containers) limited the accessibility for inspection and impeded the proper ventilation of the containers. If appropriate control measures had been applied, such as ventilation or shading of the containers, it may have eliminated the de-stabilisation of the explosives or, at least, it would have slowed down the degradation effect on the explosives.
- The operator failed to recognise the potential hazards associated with storing explosives in the open. Also, the containers were left unattended for over two years without any regular control imposed.
-The storage of a large quantity of explosives in the vicinity to the Vassilikos Power Station and the A1 highway indicates that the safe distance criteria, based on the quantity of stored explosives, were not taken into consideration for the protection of the nearby critical infrastructure in the event of an explosion within the site.
- The incident on 04/07/2011 regarding the deformed container and the concerns expressed by a Naval Base officer were ignored. The magnitude of the explosion and its consequences would have been potentially reduced if the deformed container was safely disposed, the stack was separated, and the containers were cooled. The above operations, though, may have posed a life risk to the personnel executing this task.

Awareness of the hazards and the appropriate storage conditions needs to be raised. Also, management attitude towards safety needs to be improved to guarantee the implementation of appropriate storage and of inspection schemes.

- The naval officers were not adequately informed about the content of the 98 containers and the associated hazards, nor did they have the required knowledge on handling such material, which was different from the ones typically stored at the naval base. There was also lack of knowledge on the required emergency response operations on-site in case of fire or explosion of this specific hazardous material.
- The fire brigade also showed lack of relevant knowledge (i.e., stored hazardous material in the naval base) and it was not properly informed in a timely manner about the hazardous situation. The emergency response operations by the fire brigade were rather inadequate, as no specialised emergency response plan was followed for the special case of fire and explosion associated with explosives containers.

Information about the hazard has to be provided to hazmat teams and fire fighters before starting the intervention to extinguish the fire.