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Natech Accident
DISCLAIMER: The Joint Research Centre does not guarantee the accuracy and completeness of the data in eNatech. It also reserves the right to cancel or change records without prior notification.
Type
Natech Accident
Date
1999/08/17
Natural Hazard
Kocaeli Earthquake, Turkey, 1999
Site
TUPRAS İzmit Refinery, Turkey
Status
Published

Units Involved

  1. Name
    Chemical warehouse
    Type
    Storage: Warehouse
  2. Name
    Crude oil unit stack
    Type
    Process: Stack
    Description
    Stack of the newest crude oil unit (Stack 25F-5), which is 115 m tall and with a diameter of 10.5 m.
  3. Name
    Plant 25 (Crude-oil processing plant)
    Type
    Process: Other
    Year of Construction
    1982
    Description
    Crude-oil processing capacity of 5 million t/year.
  4. Name
    Naphta tank farm
    Type
    Storage: Atmospheric storage tank

Event Sequences

  1. Name
    Chemical warehouse fire
    Unit
    1. Chemical warehouse
    Description
    Chemicals fall from storage racks and spill in warehouse, which resulted in fire.
    Initiating EventCritical EventMajor Event
    Component (Non-structural): Dislodging / displacement
    Contributing Factors
    Measure: Restraining straps or chains: Inadequate
    Release: Liquid release to ground
    Fire: Other
    The fire, which was ignited either by sparks or by exothermic chemical reactions, was extinguished in < 30 min.
    Dispersion: Combustion products in air
  2. Name
    Collapse of the crude oil unit stack
    Unit
    2. Crude oil unit stack
    Description
    Stack of the crude oil unit collapsed due to the earthquake.
    Initiating EventCritical EventMajor Event
    Building (Structural): Partial collapse
    		-
    Event Sequence: Plant 25 fire
  3. Name
    Plant 25 fire
    Unit
    3. Plant 25 (Crude-oil processing plant)
    Initiating EventCritical EventMajor Event
    Event Sequence: Collapse of the crude oil unit stack
    A fragment of the crude oil unit stack 25F-5 fell over the furnace of the plant.
    Natural Hazard: Debris impact
    Component (Structural): Partial collapse
    Component (Non-structural): Pipe break / damage
    63 product and utility pipes transporting various (hazardous) substances broke down at impact of a second fragment of the crude oil unit stack 25F-5.
    Release: Liquid release to ground
    Flammable liquids spilled from the broken pipes.
    Fire: Pool fire
    The highly flammable substances found in the pipes ignited, initially extinguished in 4h. However, the fire flared up again because of the continued fuel supply from the broken pipes connected to the burning naphta tanks in the tank farm.
    Contributing Factors
    Measure: Emergency shut off / safety valves: Unavailable
    Block valves were located close to the tanks and hence inaccessible due to fire, which in turn made it difficult to control the fuel.
  4. Name
    Naphta tank farm fire
    Unit
    4. Naphta tank farm
    Substances Involved
    1. Name
      Naphtha
    Initiating EventCritical EventMajor Event
    Natural Hazard: Liquid sloshing
    Four medium-sized floating roof naphtha storage tanks were ignited following the earthquake by sparking due to the bouncing of the floating roofs against the inner side of the tanks and subsequent metal-to-metal contact between the metallic seals and the tank walls.
    Release: Liquid release to ground
    Naphtha inside the tank started to flow outside through the flange.
    Contributing Factors
    Equipment: Corrosion / fatigue:
    The flange at the bottom of one of the tanks failed, probably due to fatigue caused by the excessive heat and structural deformation due to the earthquake.
    Fire: Pool fire
    During the first phase of the fire, fire fighting teams were successful in controlling the flames with the limited resources that had to be distributed between Plant-25 and the naphtha tank farm fires. After the start of the fire, the fires at two tanks were completely extinguished and the remaining two were under control.
    Fire: Jet fire
    The naphtha release led to a jet fire and flames covered the tanks. Roof fires started again. The fire spread through an open ditch to the tank farm located south towards the processing units.

Emergency Response

Response Planning
Emergency response plan takes Natech events into consideration: Yes
Emergency response plan is sufficient in taking Natech events into consideration: No
Difficulties in Response to the Natural Hazard
Natech event prevents access of personnel to natural hazard affected area: Yes
Natech event prevents efficient operation of personnel in the natural hazard affected area: Yes
Response to the Natural Hazard
The seismicity and the earthquake risk of the refinery were not accurately estimated.
Difficulties in Response to the Natech Event
Insufficient personnel and equipment to respond to both emergencies: Yes
Damage to lifelines (e.g. water, power, communication, transportation): Yes
Response Teams and Equipment Involved
  • On-site systems (e.g. sprinkler, water cannon)
  • On-site fire fighting team
  • On-site fire fighting trucks
  • Local fire fighting team
  • Fire fighting teams of nearby plants
  • Regional / national fire fighting teams
  • International fire fighting teams
Sheltering and Evacuation due to the Natech event
  • On-site evacuation
  • Off-site evacuation
Response to the Natech Event
TUPRAS was criticized for the lack of foaming systems on the tanks, inadequate diesel pumps, the limited application of sprinkler systems, non-interoperable firewater connections, insufficient containment ponds, the lack of fire fighting towers, and deficiencies in the coordination and management of the fire fighting activities.

Consequences

Human Health Impacts
There were no fatalities or injuries during the fire fighting.
Environmental Zones Impacted
  • Shore (e.g. beach, dune, marsh land)
  • Off-shore (e.g. estuary, sea)
Environmental Impacts
Considerable oil pollution occurred during the incident. Shortly after the earthquake, some oil spilled into the sea due to fracturing of pipes and from an oil tanker that pulled away from the loading jetty immediately (Earthq. Spectra, 16, 311-350, 2000). During the fire fighting operations, large quantities of oily water began to flow out of the embankments surrounding the tanks, spilled into the water drainage system, flooded the wastewater treatment plant, and subsequently flowed into the Izmit Bay.
On-site Material Losses
57.8 M USD
On-site Response and Remediation Costs
57.8 M USD
Economic Impacts
Due to the collapsed stack and the subsequent fire, one crude oil processing plant (Plant-25) and a pipe rack were heavily damaged. During the massive naphtha tank farm fire, 6 naphtha tanks and 30 500 t of the product were burned completely. Five additional storage tanks were heavily damaged by fire impingement. One wooden cooling tower located close to the burned naphtha tanks was burned as well. Besides the fires, considerable structural damage occurred to port facilities, storage tanks, cooling towers, and utility lines, although no significant ground failure occurred at the refinery during the earthquake except for some minimal liquefaction of the reclaimed land. The majority of the floating roof tanks (30 out of 45) were damaged due to liquid sloshing, resulting in 250 000m3 crude oil and 100 000m3 oil product having been exposed to the atmosphere and partially pouring out of the tanks. The roofs of 5 crude oil tanks were completely submerged. The total loss of crude-oil processing capacity of the refinery is 4.6 million t during the recovery period. This value is roughly equivalent to 6 months of production loss and confirms the initial estimate for the operational losses made just after the earthquake.
Built-up Areas Impacted
  • Industrial areas (e.g. factories)
  • Residential areas (e.g. housings, hotels)
  • Commercial areas (e.g. offices, shops)
  • Public areas (e.g. schools, hospitals)
  • Infrastructure (e.g. roads, railways, air transport)
Community Disruption
Train services connecting Ankara and Istanbul were disrupted because of the fire.

Remedial Activities

Restoration Activities
The majority of the units, which were out of service due to the earthquake and fire damage, were put into operation within less than 3 months after the earthquake when the refinery became functional again. Following about 200 maintenance and restoration works, which were completed earlier than planned, all units were operational after one year. During the restoration period the demand for oil products was met by additional import and increased production capacities of other refineries including the ATAS refinery in Mersin, which was the only refinery not belonging to TUPRAS at that time. It was converted into a storage facility in 2004. The total cost of restoration, including the oil spill clean-up, was 57.8 million USD, which is half of the initial estimate of 115.0 million USD. 95% of this loss was covered by the insurance.

Lessons Learned

Lessons Learned on Equipment
Increased fire water capacity (5 folds)
Portable diesel water pump (900m3/h), monitor and 600 hose (2 km)
Sea water connection to fire water system
Water sprinkler and foaming systems at all tanks
Gas and flame sensors
Upgrade of the fire water network
Upgrade of fire fighting vehicles
Water canons (50 fixed and 10 portable)
Increased oil barrier stock (3 km)
OSRL membership
Lessons Learned on Organisational Aspects
Bimonthly emergency response practices based on probable scenarios including
natechs with participation of all refinery personnel
Lessons Learned on Emergency Response Aspects
Revised emergency response plan taking natechs into consideration.
Disaster management plan with scenarios:
– Fire events at four different locations
– Fire at the largest storage tank with minimal water supply
ID: 2, Created: Serkan GIRGIN, 2010-12-09 12:01:41 – Last Updated: Amos NECCI, 2021-01-05 14:22:23

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