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eNatech - Natural-Hazard Triggered Technological Accidents Database
Natech Accident
Final
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Natech Accident
1988/10/25
13:30
120 hour(s)
Heavy Rainfall, Singapore, 1988
Singapore Refining Company (SRC), Singapore
Final

Units Involved

  1. Naphtha Storage Tank 1116 TA
    Storage: Atmospheric storage tank
    Naphtha storage tank with a capacity of 120,000 barrels (diameter 41m, shell height 20m). Tanks 1116 TA, 1116 TB, and 1116 TC were spaced at 21 m apart and they were sharing a common dike/bunded area.
  2. Naphtha Storage Tank 1116 TB
    Storage: Atmospheric storage tank
    Storage tank with a capacity of 120,000 barrels (diameter 41m, shell height 20m). Tanks 1116 TA, 1116 TB, and 1116 TC were spaced at 21 m apart and they were sharing a common dike/bunded area.
  3. Storage Tank 1116 TC
    Storage: Atmospheric storage tank
    Storage tank with a capacity of 120,000 barrels (diameter 41m, shell height 20m). Tanks 1116 TA, 1116 TB, and 1116 TC were spaced at 21 m apart and they were sharing a common dike/bunded area.

Event Sequences

  1. Fire at the SRC refinery
    1. Naphtha Storage Tank 1116 TA
    On 25 October 1988, a fire broke out at the SRC refinery at around 1.30 pm, which was the second largest fire at the refinery. Due to heavy rainfall on 24-25 October 1988, the floating roof of the storage tank 1116 TA submerged and deformed. The tank 1116 TA was receiving sour straight run naphtha when the damage at the tank's roof was observed. This operation was interrupted and naphtha was transfered out of the tank for two hours, which, however, stopped when it was noticed that antirotational pole above the tank shell was physically displaced. Ignition occurred potentially due to static discharge ignition from friction sparks caused by the mechanical failure of the pole supports.

    Because of the faulty equipment, foam could not be used to form a continuous blanket around the rim seal and extinguish the flames. Instead, the Refinery Fire Service applied foam through the tank's fixed foam pourers. During this operation, a full surface fire burst. The fire reached the adjacent Tank 1116 TB, which caught fire in the rim seal area and became totally involved within 2 hours. The third Tank 1116 TC became fully involved 7 hours later.

    The incident was caused due to the combination of flooded roof pontoons, heavy local rainfall and a partially choked drain, according to the enquiry team that investigated the incident.
    1. naphtha
    Initiating EventCritical EventMajor Event
    Natural Hazard: Sinking of floating roofs
    Due to heavy rainfall on 24-25 October 1988, the floating roof of the storage tank 1116 TA submerged and deformed.
    Contributing Factors
    Organisational: Maintenance: Inadequate
    A 2005 study of the incident pointed out that the irregular maintenance of the tank 1116 TA was not maintained regularly, which was the initial cause of the fire (article published in www.nlb.gov.sg).
    		-
    Fire: Pool fire
    The Refinery Fire Service applied foam through the tank's fixed foam pourers. During this operation, ignition occurred, potentially due to static discharge ignition during the application of foam, which immediately resulted into a full surface fire.
    Contributing Factors
    Equipment: Component failure:
    Ignition occurred potentially due to static discharge ignition from friction sparks caused by the mechanical failure of the pole supports.
    Other:
    Electrostatic hazards of foam blanketing operations
  2. Spread of fire
    2. Naphtha Storage Tank 1116 TB
    Initiating EventCritical EventMajor Event
    --
    Event Sequence: Fire at the SRC refinery
    The fire reached the adjacent Tank 1116 TB, which caught fire in the rim seal area and became totally involved within 2 hours. The third tank 1116 TC became fully involved 7 hours later.

Emergency Response

The firefighting operation involved more than 600 personnel from the Fire Service, Civil Defence, Singapore Armed Forces and 10 other government agencies.
The fire was contained within the primary bund by cooling adjacent exposed tankage.
The naphtha tanks were allowed to burn out pumping out as much product as possible.

Consequences

25
25 people (mostly firefighters) were injured, including five people with serious injuries.
Damages, loss of profit and raw materials (particularly naphtha) and construction costs of new tanks were initially estimated by insurers to be between S$15 and S$20 million (i.e., roughly 7-10 million USD in 1988). The Director of the Singapore Fire Service Arthur Lim gave a cost estimate closer to S$30 million (i.e., roughly 15 million USD in 1988). (as per article in https://www.nlb.gov.sg/)

Lessons Learned

Immediate actions should take place to dealing with sunken or jammed floating roofs of storage tanks, i.e.:
1) Any movement of oil into or out of the tank should be stopped immediately.
2) The exposed surface of the oil should be covered in foam only when necessary and with precautions.
- The implementation of new safety measures was discussed following this incident, i.e., existence of in-house firefighting facilities at offshore locations to reduce reliance on portable equipment that required considerable coordinating efforts when firefighting supplies were depleted.

-Firefighters and operators should be aware of static generation hazards from water or foam application. Tank fires can be caused by static electricity generated during the application of foam from firemen's nozzles, remote monitors or even dripping from fixed foam pourers.
ID: 140, Created: Kyriaki GKOKTSI, 2026-05-28 09:38:18 – Last Updated: Kyriaki GKOKTSI, 2026-05-28 11:02:32

Attachments

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1.Article - International Association for Fire Safety Science771.23KB
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