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eNatech- Natural-Hazard Triggered Technological Accidents Database
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Natech Accident
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The Joint Research Centre does not guarantee the accuracy and completeness of the data in eNatech. It also reserves the right to cancel or change records without prior notification.
Type
Natech Accident
Date
2005/06/24
Time
15:20
Duration
5 hour(s)
Natural Hazard
High temperatures, United States, 2005
Site
Praxair Distribution Inc., United States
Status
Published
Units Involved
Name
Propylene Cylinder 1
Type
Storage: Pressurized storage tank
Description
Nearly 30,000 storage cylinders (propane, propylene, oxygen, hydrogen, acetylene, carbon dioxide, helium, etc.) were held onsite. The cylinders were divided into three categories: “full”, “empty”, and “returned” sections.
The “returned” section, where the fire originated, refers to cylinders returned for refilling, which may not always be empty when returned.
Name
Other Cylinders (Propylene, Propane, Acetylene)
Type
Storage: Pressurized storage tank
Event Sequences
Name
Propylene Release and Ignition
Unit
1. Propylene Cylinder 1
Description
When exposed to high temperatures and direct sunlight, propylene cylinders can spontaneously vent through their
relief devices. This, in turn, vents and releases propylene, which when ignited, can heat surrounding cylinders and cause them to vent. This reflects into a domino effect that spreads the fire.
Substances Involved
Name
Propylene
CAS No
115-07-1
Initiating Event
Critical Event
Major Event
Substance: Over-pressurization
Due to high ambient temperature and radiant heat from the asphalt paving, the propylene cylinder wall temperatures rose and the internal pressure increased.
Release: Gas, vapour, mist, or smoke release to air
Due to increased internal pressure on the cylinder, the relief valve opened and vent propylene.
Contributing Factors
Measure: Emergency shut off / safety valves:
Inadequate
Premature open of a safety relief valve (potentially of CG-7 type), below the minimum required pressure, due to weak design standards.
Event Sequence: Domino Effect - Fire Spread and Explosions
The venting propylene ignited (most likely from a static discharge) and got into fire. A ten-foot high flame was seen by a technician outside the storage area.
Name
Domino Effect - Fire Spread and Explosions
Unit
2. Other Cylinders (Propylene, Propane, Acetylene)
Substances Involved
Name
Propane
CAS No
74-98-6
Name
Acetylene
CAS No
74-86-2
Initiating Event
Critical Event
Major Event
Event Sequence: Propylene Release and Ignition
A domino event was triggered as the fire further heated an adjacent propylene cylinder.
Release: Gas, vapour, mist, or smoke release to air
More propylene was vented and released.
Fire: Fire spread
The released propylene caught fire. The growing fire heated additional cylinders, which released more propylene into the fire. The fire’s intensity continued to raise cylinder temperatures, softening the steel and rupturing the cylinders. The fire spread to a group of acetylene cylinders. Within 4 minutes, the fire covered most of the facility’s flammable gas cylinder area (liquefied petroleum gas, LPG, area), triggering explosions that ruptured cylinders (acetylene, propane, and propylene) and rocketed them as far as 244 meters (800 feet) from the area.
Weather Conditions
Precipitation
None
Temperature
36 °C
Description
Heat wave with bright sunlight and temperatures reaching 36 degrees Celcius (97 degrees Fahrenheit)
Emergency Response
Response Teams and Equipment Involved
Local fire fighting team
Sheltering and Evacuation due to the Natech event
On-site evacuation
Response to the Natech Event
22 employees and two customers evacuated safely in accordance with Praxair’s procedures.
The St. Louis Fire Department arrived within 15 min (at about 3:35 pm) from the activation of the fire alarm. By that time, a large number of flammable gas cylinders were already involved in the fire. With explosions propelling cylinders in all directions inside and outside the facility, firefighters:
- set up a fiveblock perimeter;
- evacuated local residents;
- established an unmanned water spray on the fire, and retreated to a safe distance; and
- extinguished secondary fires started by cylinders propelled offsite.
The fire department did not actively fight the main fire due to the danger of rocketing cylinders. The fire was finally controlled after 5 hours (at about 8:30 pm).
Consequences
On-site Fatalities
1
Human Health Impacts
The St. Louis Chief Medical Examiner attributed the death of one St. Louis resident to an asthma attack triggered by noxious smoke and fumes from the incident.
Economic Impacts
The facility was damaged extensively by fire and water.
A corner of the main production building and store area was heavily fire-damaged.
Inside, the office and store areas were water- and smoke-damaged.
The fire consumed nearly the entire inventory of flammable gas, or about 8,000 cylinders.
Built-up Areas Impacted
Residential areas (e.g. housings, hotels)
Public areas (e.g. schools, hospitals)
Community Disruption
Dozens of cylinders and cylinder parts were propelled into the community and were found on sidewalks, front yards, backyards,
courtyards, parking lots, and under cars.
Damage included:
- a burned-out empty commercial building;
-fire-damaged cars;
- a three-foot hole in the wall of one residential building;
- broken windows, and other destruction to residential and commercial buildings.
- Cylinder parts traveled as far as 800 feet from the area of the explosions
- The fire plume spread asbestos from ruptured acetylene cylinders over a 1/3-mile wide and 1-mile long area.
Lessons Learned
Lessons Learned on Equipment
High ambient temperatures, in combination with low relief valve opening pressure, increase the risk of catastrophic fires at facilities handling propylene cylinders.
Lessons Learned on Organisational Aspects
- Adopting best practices for storing and handling propylene cylinders can reduce this risk at gas distribution facilities.
- Revising current practices to provide a greater margin between the minimum relief opening pressure and the vapor pressure of propylene will reduce the risk even when best practices are not followed.
According to National Fire Codes, CGA’s “Safe Handling of Compressed Gases in Containers,”, the best practices for storing cylinders outdoors outline the following:
- Ensure the pressure relief valve is in direct communication with the vapor space;
- Use a well-ventilated area away from oxidizers, open flames, sparks, etc.;
- Post “No-Smoking” signs;
- Post hazard class or name of gases on containers;
- Group by hazard class;
- Protect from objects that will damage the metal surface — not near elevators, walkways, platform edges, or below heavy moving objects that may fall;
- Protect from tampering;
- Avoid prolonged exposure to a damp environment (graded surface prevents water accumulation); and
- Do not obstruct exit routes.
Lessons Learned on Mitigation Measures
According to the CSB Safety Bulletin issue (No. 2005-05-B, June 2006), propylene gas vendors are advised to:
1. Install deluge systems or fixed fire nozzles to cool cylinders in case of a fire to prevent propylene gas cylinder hazards.
Exploding and rocketing cylinders put firefighters at risk when attempting to extinguish a gas repackaging plant fire. Fixed fire protection such as fire monitors, deluge, or sprinkler systems can immediately cool cylinders reducing the likelihood of additional cylinder releases, fire
spread, and off-site consequences.
2. Provide barriers to limit fire spread;
Using barriers in storage areas can contain exploding cylinders and limit the spread of the fire in the first critical minutes before firefighters arrive.
3. Use flammable gas detectors in storage areas to provide early detection of venting cylinders.
Area flammable gas monitors can detect releases. Detection of flammable gases may allow safety systems (such as alarms and deluge) to activate before ignition, reducing the likelihood of uncontrolled fires.
ID: 114, Created: Kyriaki GKOKTSI, 2024-01-19 17:09:53 – Last Updated: Kyriaki GKOKTSI, 2024-02-12 14:43:19
Created: Kyriaki GKOKTSI, 2024-01-19 17:09:53
Updated: Kyriaki GKOKTSI, 2024-01-19 17:23:16
Updated: Kyriaki GKOKTSI, 2024-01-19 17:40:38
Updated: Kyriaki GKOKTSI, 2024-01-19 17:49:20
Updated: Kyriaki GKOKTSI, 2024-01-19 17:53:31
Updated: Kyriaki GKOKTSI, 2024-01-19 17:54:49
Updated: Kyriaki GKOKTSI, 2024-01-19 18:09:48
Updated: Kyriaki GKOKTSI, 2024-01-19 18:11:12
Updated: Kyriaki GKOKTSI, 2024-01-22 10:05:20
Updated: Kyriaki GKOKTSI, 2024-01-22 10:14:44
Updated: Kyriaki GKOKTSI, 2024-01-22 10:26:24
Updated: Kyriaki GKOKTSI, 2024-01-22 10:34:25
Updated: Kyriaki GKOKTSI, 2024-01-22 10:40:48
Updated: Kyriaki GKOKTSI, 2024-01-22 10:48:36
Updated: Kyriaki GKOKTSI, 2024-01-22 10:48:54
Updated: Kyriaki GKOKTSI, 2024-01-22 17:24:39
Updated: Kyriaki GKOKTSI, 2024-01-22 17:25:45
Updated: Kyriaki GKOKTSI, 2024-02-07 09:58:35
Updated: Kyriaki GKOKTSI, 2024-02-12 14:43:19
Attachments
No
Description
File Size
1.
CSB Safety Bulletin Report
371.43KB